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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade and a half, highway and transportation officials have begun to 
use a new contracting approach to deliver major projects to the public. The use of design-
build delivery represents a departure from the traditional low bid system that has been used 
on highway projects. Design-build brings significant changes in roles, processes, and 
philosophies during all phases of a project. The design-build system has been recognized on 
numerous projects for offering certain advantages over the traditional system. 
The Minnesota Department of Transportation has undertaken its first major "best 
value" design-build project, reconstruction of a segment of U.S. Trunk Highway 52 (the 
"ROC-52" project) through the city of Rochester, Minnesota. To evaluate the effectiveness 
of design-build utilization on this project, an interview-based case study method of research 
has been used. This thesis is a qualitative analysis of the ROC-52 best-value design-build 
project, with consideration of a set of crucial project performance characteristics. Ultimately 
this document will assess the effect of design-build on the success of the project, as well as 
provide conclusions and recommendations for future design-build endeavors. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The delivery of major transportation infrastructure projects is evolving. Critical 
expectations have been placed on transportation officials to deliver projects faster and with 
fewer public impacts, but still meeting budget constraints. Many states have undertaken 
projects with dollar amounts ranging well into the hundreds of millions, up to one billion and 
beyond. Transportation policy makers have been looking for new ways to deliver these 
major projects to the public. 
The transportation industry has begun to emulate construction practices in the private 
sector by starting to use design-build delivery on certain projects. Design-build represents a 
departure from the traditional means by which transportation infrastructure is delivered. 
Whereas the traditional system of design-bid-build is characterized by a disconnect between 
the plan preparation and construction phases, design-build is a more integrated approach. In 
design-build, roles of the owner, designer, and contractor change. 
Design-build delivery can offer certain advantages over the traditional design-bid-
build system. Several key characteristics of the design-build process have been identified-
projects can be completed faster, impacts to the public can be reduced, and the design-build 
contractor is enabled to use more innovation to save time and money. 
The research effort for this report focused on a major design-build highway 
reconstruction project of the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT). The 
project, known as "ROC-52," is an 11-mile reconstruction of U.S. Trunk Highway 52 
through the city of Rochester, Minnesota. Utilizing a case study approach, data and 
information have been collected regarding the effectiveness of design-build delivery on the 
project. Ultimately, the aim of this thesis is to identify the specific project parameters where 
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the use of design-build on ROC-52 contributed to the project's success, and provide 
recommendations for the use of design-build on future transportation projects. 
Thesis Statement 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide insight into the use of design-build project 
delivery on the ROC-52 project. This thesis will identify specific project parameters that 
were impacted by the decision to use design-build rather than the traditional system delivery 
system, and will methodically examine these factors. The aim will be to determine which 
areas have been positively impacted by design-build, as well as identify areas which could 
have been improved upon. Consequently, recommendations will be made that could be 
beneficial to Mn/DOT or other state transportation agencies (STAs) on future design-build 
highway projects. In addition, this document will contribute to the growing body of literature 
on the subject of design-build contracting on highway and transportation projects. Due to the 
unique nature of these projects, a common method for evaluating and recording the 
experiences is through a case study approach. The areas of success on ROC-52 were 
expected to bear some similarity to other design-build highway projects; however, there were 
also many outcomes from the project that make this case study a unique contribution to 
design-build literature. 
Background on Design-Build 
The concept of "project delivery" refers to the entire set of steps involved with both 
design and construction of a project, including the management activities required for these 
tasks. There are several different methods of project delivery which can be used on projects, 
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including design-build, design-bid-build, and construction manager at risk. The selection of 
a delivery method is dependent on many factors that involve the type of project to be 
constructed and the priorities of the owner. 
Historically, the standard delivery method used on highway and transportation 
projects has been design-bid-build. The design-bid-build system is commonly referred to as 
either the "low bid" or "traditional" means of project delivery. As the system of roads and 
highways developed in the United States over the course of the 20th Century, STAs which 
administered the construction of these facilities adopted the design-bid-build system as the 
method of awarding contracts. Government agencies have been obligated to provide services 
at the lowest possible cost, so the design-bid-build system was utilized as the simplest way to 
achieve this. Design-bid-build asserts that the lowest bidder for any particular job should be 
granted the contract, provided they can adequately perform the work in an acceptable period 
of time. 
While the concept of design-build project delivery is not new to the construction 
industry, it is relatively new to highway construction. The origins of design-build can be 
traced as far back as ancient Greece, where so-called "master builders" integrated the design 
and construction processes on major public buildings and civil projects. As early as the 
1940s, the private sector used the design-build approach for construction of office buildings, 
industrial plants, retail centers, and a host of other projects. As of 1997, an estimated 77 
percent of all private sector construction projects were built using the design-build approach 
(NSPE, 2003). However, the traditional design-bid-build system had been retained as the 
exclusive means for delivery of highway and transportation projects until the 1990s. 
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Design-build was not permitted in the highway industry until The Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) passed its Special Experimental Project Number 14 (known as SEP-
14) in 1990. SEP-14 gave ST As the authority to pursue several new methods of innovative 
contracting on a provisional basis, including design-build (FHW A, 2002). Since the 
enactment of SEP-14, most states have begun to explore design-build delivery as an option 
for transportation projects. By 2005, all but 6 six states had authorized the conditional, if not 
universal, use of design-build (Warne, 2005). 
There are several notable differences in the activities and roles of design-bid-build 
and design-build. First consider design-bid-build: project design in the design-bid-build 
method is the responsibility of the owner. For example, a department of transportation 
(DOT) owner using design-bid-build will either utilize its own team of in-house designers or 
hire a private design consultant to prepare a finished set of plans for construction. These 
plans are complete and suitable for any qualified contractor to build the project. The DOT 
would then make the plans and specifications available to contractors and solicit sealed bids 
for construction. The construction contract is awarded by the owner to the lowest responsive 
and qualified bidder. 
Design-build varies from design-bid-build in how the design document is handled. 
At the beginning of the project, the owner defines its final productand hires a single entity-
a designer-builder partnership, or design-build "team"--to complete both design and 
construction of the project. Design-build provides for a unique relationship between the two 
phases of design and construction. Unlike design-bid-build, design-build projects do not 
require a completed set of plans to start construction. The contractor's designer completes 
plans to a minimum level so that early construction activities can start. Construction then 
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continues while the plans are being finished. The completed, detailed plans are handed over 
to the contractor in a timely manner to build the rest of the work. 
The award procedure of a design-build contract is typically different from the award 
of a design-bid-build project as well. While traditionally delivered projects are awarded on a 
strictly low-bid basis, design-build project award processes typically consider other factors, 
such as quality and inflationary savings from faster construction, in the contractor selection 
process. The design-build award process encourages-if not requires-more dialogue 
between owner and contractor during the procurement phase, and allows the value of these 
other factors to be explored and quantified. The process by which these other factors are 
accounted for in contractor selection is referred to as "best value" design-build. 
The bulk of this thesis will be the exploration how the decision to use design-build 
rather than design-bid-build on ROC-52 affected several key project parameters. 
The ROC-52 Project 
ROC-52 was the largest single highway contract in Department history when it was 
awarded to the design-build team of Zumbro River Constructors (ZRC) for $232 Million in 
2002 (Lessons, 2003). The project's implementation as design-build was governed by the 
policies established in the FHWA's SEP-14 innovative contracting methodology. It marked 
the first time Mn/DOT used a "best value" approach during the procurement and construction 
letting processes. As a result, it was of great interest to evaluate different aspects of the 
project to ascertain how the use of design-build instead of traditional delivery impacted their 
performance. 
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The ROC-52 project spans a distance of approximately 11 miles through the city of 
Rochester in Olmsted County. At the north end, the project starts at the junction of U.S. 
Highway 52 and 85th Street NW. From 85th Street NW to 65th Street NW, the reconstructed 
section will be rural highway. The urban freeway reconstruction begins at 65th Street and 
carries through the city to the south end of the project, located at the junction of Highway 52 
and U.S. Highway 63 (Mn/DOT, 2005). 
Highway 52 is of critical importance to both the traveling public and the city's several 
major industries, including the Mayo Clinic and IBM, as well as several retail centers. The 
Highway 52 corridor also serves as the primary connecting route between Southeastern 
Minnesota and the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. These factors necessitated that 
minimal congestion and safe driving conditions be maintained during all phases of the ROC-
52 construction. 
Prior to the new construction, this segment of highway was a four-lane controlled-
access freeway, consisting of two through lanes in both directions. The project will expand 
the highway to six lanes, with three through lanes in each direction. Included in the project 
scope are grading, roadway surfacing, drainage considerations and formation of detention 
ponds, and construction of roadway structures-bridges, noise walls and retaining walls. 
The improvements also include the installation of traffic signals, lighting, signing, and 
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) devices. The project requires new construction, 
reconstruction, or modification of 12 different interchanges or overpasses along the route, as 
well as construction or reconstruction of24 permanent bridges (Mn/DOT, 2003). Additional 
peripheral improvements encompassed by ROC-52 include modification of existing frontage 
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roads, creation of bicycle or pedestrian paths, and some work to a section of Trunk Highway 
14 that passes under Highway 52. 
Decision to Use Design-Build on ROC-52 
Mn/DOT' s decision to use design-build on ROC-52 is central to the issues addressed 
throughout this thesis. The aim of this study was to evaluate the use of design-build on 
ROC-52, so it important to understand why the project was selected for design-build. 
It is commonly accepted that design-build can allow a faster project schedule 
(discussed further in the Literature Review in the Chapter 2 of this report). Schedule was a 
primary consideration in the decision to use design-build on ROC-52. Exploratory planning 
for the project began in the late 1980s, with the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), a key 
step in the planning process, being completed in 1996. At that time, Mn/DOT concluded that 
through their traditional project pipeline it would take more than 11 years and as many as 15 
stages to complete the scope of improvements to the project corridor. This was due to the 
annual funding limitations for its districts (Rochester is located in Mn/DOT District 6) 
(Mn/DOT, 2005). 
In 2000, Mn/DOT's District 6 and City of Rochester partnered to complete an 
Economic Impact Study for the corridor reconstruction. The study considered four different 
staging and timeline alternatives, along with their related impacts to retail transfer and 
business at the several different commercial and business centers in Rochester. The major 
conclusion of the study was that a five-year maximum timeline was recommended to curtail 
detrimental effects to local businesses and motorists (Staging, 2001). 
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A second major consideration in choosing design-build for the ROC-52 project was 
the availability of funding. District funding restrictions in Mn/DOT's program had limited 
the annual amount available for the project and consequently stretched its duration to 11 
years, which was deemed an unacceptable alternative by the Economic Impact Study. The 
use of design-build allowed Mn/DOT to utilize a variety of non-traditional finance 
mechanisms, most notably Federal Accelerated Construction (F AC) funding. 
ROC-52 was selected for the design-build process in November of 2001 as a result of 
the schedule and funding concerns identified by Mn/DOT. The project would be completed 
under a single contract, rather than being as many as 15 separate projects under the original 
traditional option. The reduction of construction schedule by design-build was from 11 years 
down to 5, which, as discussed later, was cut even more. Design-build also enabled 
Mn/DOT to utilize F AC money to enable funding of the project, and prevent having ROC-52 
monopolize Department allocations for District 6. 
ROC-52 Letting 
Letting for ROC-52 was held on November 1, 2002. In the one-year period from 
project initiation to letting, Mn/DOT utilized a new procurement approach to award this best-
value design-build project. They began by issuing a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) to 
solicit qualified teams to complete the project. Mn/DOT received and approved four 
Statements of Qualifications (SOQ) from proposing design-build teams, thereby establishing 
their "short list" of accepted proposals for the project. Mn/DOT then issued the Request for 
Proposals (RFP) for the project. 
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The best-value methodology on ROC-52 considered merits of the teams' technical 
proposals as well as the financial (letting date) proposals. Teams' technical proposals were 
reviewed by the seven-person Mn/DOT Design-Build Technical Review Committee, and 
each proposal was given a score on a scale of 100. Points were divided into 4 areas: project 
management ( 40), project understanding (30), schedule (25), and innovation (5). Each point 
earned was assigned a dollar value of $2.5 Million, for best-value scoring purposes only. 
The value of the technical proposals was then combined with the dollar value of the teams' 
bid at letting, and the resulting "low bidder" was awarded the contract. The best-value 
approach essentially allowed Mn/DOT to, for the first time in its history, put a dollar value 
on important project considerations beyond just the bid amount. 
The winning design-build team for the project was Zumbro River Constructors 
(ZRC), LLC-a joint venture by Fluor Corporation, Ames Construction, Inc., and Edward 
Kraemer and Sons, Inc. ZRC had both the highest technical score and the lowest bid price 
for the project. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While there have been many successful design-build projects in the United States in 
the past 15 years, the process is still new to the highway and transportation industry and the 
body of literature regarding them is still relatively small. A few sources of literature had 
particular relevance to design-build delivery on the ROC-52 project. 
FHWA Design-Build Literature 
With the enactment of SEP-14 in 1990, the FHW A enabled the use of design-build 
delivery on highway projects. SEP-14 allowed the provisional use of newer, innovative 
contracting methods which were not previously permitted on publicly-funded highway and 
transportation projects. Design-build was one of four methods permitted by SEP-14; the 
other three include lane rental, A+B contracting, and warranties. Under SEP-14, STAs were 
allowed to use design-build on a conditional basis with FHWA approval. Since SEP-14, all 
four types of innovative contracting methods have been accepted for wider use, with design-
build the last of these, beginning in 2003. 
In December of 2002, more than a decade after the enactment of SEP-14, the FHW A 
issued its "Final Rule" on Design-Build Contracting, which took effect in January of 2003. 
The Final Rule is a comprehensive document that essentially removed the previously 
conditional nature by which design-build projects were permitted, and outlined specific rules 
and regulations for its implementation. It affirmed that states are permitted to use design-
build delivery if they choose, but that they are in no way required to use it. Final Rule was 
essentially an acknowledgement of the success of design-build under the SEP-14 provisions 
and a formality in allowing the wider use of design-build in the transportation industry. 
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AASHTO Design-Build Literature 
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) has assembled some literature regarding the use of design-build delivery on 
highway projects. As a national organization comprised of highway and transportation 
officials from all 50 states, AASHTO is a leader in the development of transportation policies 
and standard practices. 
In 2001, AASHTO issued its Primer on Contracting/or the Twenty-first Century. 
The document summarized various new practices and contract administration techniques 
being used on transportation projects. The section on design-build highlights some of the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of design-build. Among the possible advantages 
mentioned: a faster project timeline can be achieved; greater flexibility is given to the 
contractor to use innovation in design, materials, and methods; the value of bids can be 
adjusted to account for timeliness, quality, and other priorities in addition to cost. The 
primary disadvantage of design-build discussed was the difficulty for smaller firms to 
compete for large projects, as design-build contracts tend to be. A key conclusion from the 
Primer is that influential organizations such as AASHTO have recognized the value of the 
design-build process. 
Design-Build Research 
Academic research about design-build has been conducted at some locations. 
Researchers at the University of Colorado and Utah State University are among the 
authorities on the subject of design-build project delivery in the highway and transportation 
industry. 
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University of Colorado 
Keith Molenaar of the University of Colorado is a leading national researcher on 
design-build project delivery. As a stipulation of 1997's Transportation Equity Act for the 
21st Century (TEA-21), the U.S. Department of Transportation, parent agency of the FHWA, 
was required to issue a set of official regulations to allow highway design-build contracting 
on a wider scale. Molenaar, along with two research corporations-Science Application 
International Corporation (SAIC) and AECOM Consult, Inc.-were contracted to complete a 
comprehensive study of design-build in the federal-aid highway program (Molenaar, 2005). 
The report was submitted to the FHWA earlier this year, and its findings are yet to be 
released. 
Molenaar was the principal investigator on a design-build case study completed for 
the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT). The report, issued in 
January of 2003, was an evaluation of several project performance characteristics of 
WSDOT's first design-build project, reconstruction of the SR500 Thurston Way Interchange 
in Vancouver, Washington. Among the performance characteristics the study considered 
were the project's cost, time, quality, management implications, and lessons learned. The 
approach to the study was to consult key project stakeholders and compare the results with 
design-build to the expected results if it had delivered by the traditional method. 
The WSDOT case study arrived at several conclusions. In terms of cost, the project 
was 23% higher than anticipated under design-bid-build delivery. Molenaar's conclusion 
was there were too many factors different between the two delivery methods to determine 
exactly why the variance occurred or to necessarily attribute it to the delivery method. 
However, the cost growth after the award was limited to 1 %, which is significantly less than 
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the typical design-bid-build cost growth range of 5-10%. The project was completed 16% 
faster with design-build than it was estimated under design-bid-build. In terms of quality, 
those contacted believed it to be equal to or better than expected under design-bid-build. 
Design-build delivery of the SR500 project required fewer personnel from the DOT 
perspective, but a more experienced staff would have been beneficial. 
Molenaar served as a technical consultant on the Iowa State University ROC-52 case 
study that was the focus for this thesis. He has suggested that due to the high degree of 
variability and uniqueness on different design-build projects, the best way to analyze them is 
a performance-based case study methodology similar to the WSDOT study. 
Utah Technology Transfer Center 
Researchers at the Utah Technology Transfer (T2) Center, in conjunction with Utah 
State University, compiled a Design-Build Best Practices Guide that outlined some important 
considerations for design-build on highway projects (Bolling, 2002). The T2 guide focused 
primarily on selection considerations for design-build projects. Specifically, the following 
characteristics were recommended of highway and transportation projects being considered 
for design-build: 
• Project has a clearly defined scope, design basis, and performance requirements 
• The project is free from complicated issues such as utility conflicts, right-of-way 
acquisition, hazardous materials, or wetland and environmental concerns 
• The project is non-controversial in nature 
• The project has room for innovation in the design and construction 
• The project is an emergency project or one with tight time constrains 
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• The project involves a significant design effort with a potential to save cost and time in 
the design 
Design-Build Journal Articles 
Several academic journal articles have been published which have significance to the 
use of design-build on highway construction projects. Journal literature on the subject 
discussed a variety of areas, the most relevant of these are life cycle considerations in·best-
value design-build award and evaluation of owners' quality approaches in the design-build 
proposal process. 
Douglas D. Gransberg, associate professor of construction science at the University 
of Oklahoma, along with Keith Molenaar of the University of Colorado, examined life cycle 
cost considerations in the design-build award process. In a paper titled "Life-Cycle Cost 
Award Algorithms for Design/Build Highway Pavement Projects" from the December 2004 
Journal of Infrastructure Systems, they study a life-cycle cost algorithm developed by the 
FHWA to assist with the award of best-value design-build pavement projects. Through 
examination of several projects, the conclusion of the paper was that the FHW A method 
places a strong bias on lowest cost for design and construction, and that more emphasis could 
be placed on life cycle concerns such as maintenance and durability. The significance to 
design-build as a whole is that the non-cost factors such as life cycle performance should 
receive greater emphasis in the proposal and selection phase of projects. 
Gransberg and Molenaar also examined quality management issues in design-build. 
In a paper titled "Analysis of Owner's Design and Construction Quality Management 
Approaches in Design/Build Projects" from the October 2004 Journal of Management in 
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Engineering, the authors analyzed 78 design-build projects from 1997 to 2002 and 
considered the cost-schedule-quality balance that is determined by the owner for projects. 
The paper noted that in the design-bid-build system, quality is more of a fixed parameter of 
the project through the plans and specifications. Schedule is also typically a fixed aspect, 
leaving the cost to be the area of competition from design-bid-build projects. In design-
build, however, cost and schedule are usually the fixed considerations and quality is more a 
competitive area in the proposal phase of a project. Six owner approaches to quality in the 
RFP were identified--qualifications, evaluated program, specified program, performance 
criteria, specification, and warranty. Design-build contractors should understand the 
implications and levels of specification of these approaches to be able to prepare a proposal 
to meet the owner's quality expectations for a project (Gransberg, 2004). 
Tom Warne Design-Build Report 
Of particular relevance to the ROC-52 project was a report prepared by Tom Warne 
and Associates, LLC, consulting on behalf of the California Design Build Coalition. 
Warne's study looked at 21 different design-build highway projects nationwide; ROC-52 was 
among these, as were several projects in states including Arizona, California, Colorado, 
South Carolina, and Virginia. Projects in the study ranged from $83 Million to $1.3 Billion. 
The report, titled Design-Build Contracting for Highway Projects, contains two major 
components: an assessment of the projects' performance in several project parameters, and 
an examination of design-build practices used on the projects. Warne's report was issued in 
May of2005. 
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Warne's assessment of design-build performance considered each of the 21 projects 
in 4 key areas by which project success is measured-schedule, cost, quality and owner 
satisfaction. Warne contacted leaders of the 21 projects and queried them on these four 
project areas. 
It was found that on 13 of the 21 projects studied, schedule was the primary reason 
behind selection of design-build as a delivery method. The effectiveness of schedule on a 
design-build project was evaluated two different ways--comparing the project's actual 
performance to its planned completion, or comparing the design-build schedule to the 
expected scenario using traditional design-bid-build delivery. In the first case, 76% of the 
projects in the study were completed ahead of the original time allotted by the owner. For 
the second case, interviewees were asked to estimate the time the each project would have 
taken if the project had been delivered by design-bid-build, and those estimates were 
compared to the time taken using design-build. In 100% of the projects, the design-build 
projects were built faster than they would have been with design-bid-build. 
W ame noted that direct comparison of costs between projects of different delivery 
methods is difficult because of the multitude of uncertainties and variables that influence the 
comparisons made. The most prominent conclusion made about cost in design-build projects 
is that the level of price certainty is higher because cost growth is reduced. The projects in 
the study exhibited an aggregate cost growth rate ofless than 4%, compared to the typical 
design-bid-build growth rate of 5-10%. The report also emphasized cost savings that come 
from the accelerated construction schedule in design-build. When these projects finish ahead 
of schedule, often in terms of months or years, savings are realized because of inflation and 
other factors. 
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Views about quality were collected from interviewees from each of the projects in the 
study. The report states that quality on every project was declared to be better than or equal 
to the quality which would have been achieved under design-bid-build delivery. 
Owner representatives from the 21 design-build projects responded to a series of 
questions about their satisfaction with the project and whether they would have interest in 
doing future design-build projects. The owners were widely pleased with the design-build 
process, and expressed desire to use design-build delivery in the future based on their 
experience with the project in question. 
Design-build delivery affects the roles and responsibilities of all players on a project. 
From an owner's perspective, project management often involves different-from-traditional 
functions during the planning, RFP, and bidding phases of the project. On more than half of 
the projects considered, the project is managed by state DOTs with help from an outside 
consultant. On the contractor side, a greater level of management of day-to-day project 
activities is required, notably on design management and quality management. 
Commonly, the decision to use design-build was driven by the need for an accelerated 
schedule and quicker project delivery. As stated, 13 of the 21 projects cited schedule as the 
primary motivation for using design-build. In some cases, the decision to use design-build is 
also motivated by the need to accommodate funding conditions. Some projects, including 
ROC-52, had limited time windows to spend available federal funding that only design-
build's accelerated nature can accommodate. 
Funding for design-build comes from a range of sources, including federal and state 
governments, tolls, and private enterprise. Federal and state monies were the most common 
source of funding, as they have traditionally been for transportation projects. 
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Although quality was not mentioned as a primary reason why owners choose design-
build, it is nonetheless an important factor in overall success of the project. The use of 
design-build requires contractors and owner to accept different roles than on traditional 
projects to reach quality objectives, particularly in the way of quality control and quality 
assurance. A major shift in design-build projects is that quality control (QC), the process of 
ensuring that craftspeople perform work in a manner that meets or exceeds expectations, is 
the responsibility of the contractor in 19 of the 21 projects reviewed. Quality assurance 
(QA), oversight and testing to make sure QC standards are met, is retained by the owners in 
10 of 21 cases, with QA done by a consultant on 4 of the projects. 
Warne's report bears a high level of significance to ROC-52, being one of the 21 
projects reviewed. The general findings regarding design-build on all of the projects were 
consistent with the findings of this specific case study on ROC-52. Schedule and funding 
were major contributors to the decision to the decision to make ROC-52 a design-build 
project, as they were with other projects in the study. Warne notes that comparisons of costs 
of design-build vs. design-bid-build are, at best, very difficult because of numerous factors. 
Overall, Warne's report seems to confirm that the motivations, processes, and results 
associated with the use of design-build project delivery on highway projects nationwide are 
consistent with the findings on ROC-52. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHOD 
ISU-Mn/DOT Research Project 
A team of researchers from Iowa State University was contracted by Mn/DOT in 
2004 to investigate the effectiveness of alternative contracting methods on transportation 
projects. The aim of this research was to compare the traditional system of design-bid-build 
contracting to less conventional delivery systems, and provide Mn/DOT with insight and 
recommendations for use in transportation projects. Mn/DOT's desire for such a study 
occurred as completion neared on their first major best-value design-build project, ROC-52. 
The research project was comprised of two principal components. The first of these 
was a wide-ranging investigation of several types of alternative contracting techniques 
presented in SEP-14, including A+B contracts, lane rental contracts, and design-build 
contracts. This section was intended to provide insight about success factors related to the 
different contracting approaches. From this, recommendations were made as to the 
suitability of each of these methods to different types of transportation projects. 
The second part of the research effort provided the research basis for this thesis-a 
case study ofROC-52. The purpose of the case study was to thoroughly investigate the 
ROC-52 project by several different performance characteristics, evaluate the effectiveness 
of the delivery, and prepare a set of recommendations to improve the administration of future 
design-build projects in Minnesota. 
Research Method 
Making a comparison between two delivery methods presented a difficult challenge, 
since it is obviously not possible to build identical projects twice using both design-build and 
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design-bid-build. None ofMn/DOT's design-bid-build projects were similar enough to 
ROC-52 to make for a valid comparison on a project-to-project basis. Consequently, the 
strategy for researching the effectiveness of one method versus the other was to gather data 
from individuals with close knowledge of the project and the two delivery methods. 
Ultimately their responses would provide insight on how the use of design-build rather than 
design-bid-build affected the project's execution. 
Keith Molenaar served as a consultant for the Mn/DOT research project. In an 
October 2004 meeting with Molenaar, it was determined that the best strategy for evaluating · 
the use of design-build on ROC-52 was a case study approach similar to the one the 
University of Colorado research team used in their WSDOT Thurston Way Interchange case 
study. Data collection for the ROC-52 case study included the following steps: 
• Identification of several key project performance parameters by which project success 
can be evaluated 
• Development of a set of questions related to each of the performance parameters 
• Identification of appropriate personnel to interview about the use of design-build rather 
than design-bid-build on ROC-52 
• Collection of data from interviewees 
Project Performance Parameters 
A total of 9 project performance parameters were identified for use in the ROC-52 
case study. Each parameter was determined to be an important consideration in evaluating 
the effectiveness of processes and the overall success of the venture, as noted in Mn/DOT's 
2003 Statewide Transportation Plan document. For each performance category, a set of 3-5 
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interview questions were devised to determine how the use of design-build affected ROC-52, 
compared to the interviewee's expectation if traditional delivery were used. The nine 
specific parameters identified: administrative costs, construction costs, time, management 
complexity, disruptions to third parties, road user costs, quality, innovation, and funding 
flexibility. In addition, a brief set of general delivery and project-related questions was asked 
at the end of each interview. 
Administrative Costs. The administrative costs on the project were defined as the 
different types of internal costs which Mn/DOT incurred in managerial, tracking, and clerical 
processes. Administrative costs to the project were those not directly included in design, 
construction, right-of-way (ROW). 
Construction Costs. Construction costs for the project included first costs and 
payments to the contractor, the cost of engineering and design, and costs related to changes 
m scope. 
Time. Project time referred to the overall length of time spent in planning, 
procurement, design, construction, and extensions. 
Management Complexity. The concept of management complexity referred to the 
delivery method's effect on the relative difficulty of coordinating issues encountered over the 
course of the project. Management complexity could include any management-related aspect 
of the project-executing the procurement phase of the project, planning, establishment of 
scope, logistical challenges during preconstruction and construction, or unforeseen problems 
that arose during implementation of the project. 
Disruptions to Third Parties. Third parties potentially affected by the project 
included businesses, schools, churches, residential neighborhoods, local governments, and 
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other establishments or destinations. The term "disruptions" encompassed any change in the 
normal patterns of activities at these entities necessitated by activities on the project. Affects 
on community events or seasonal activities were also considered. 
Road User Costs. Road user costs referred to the costs incurred by the motoring 
public resulting from the project. Some examples of road user costs include accidents, driver 
time, and additional vehicle mileage resulting from detours. While Mn/DOT does have a 
method for determining road user costs, the calculation has its greatest merit after a project 
has been completed. This study did not attempt to quantify what the road user costs will be 
at project completion, but rather, it speaks to the perceptions of how they may have been 
different as a result of design-build delivery. 
Quality. Quality referred to the level of workmanship and the end products' 
performance versus what is expected by the owner. The quality performance parameter also 
included consideration of the general processes used to achieve and assure quality on the 
project. 
Innovation. Innovation referred to the contractor's use of newer or less conventional 
concepts, construction methods, or materials on the project. This also included their 
flexibility to make design changes and their ability to pursue alternative these ideas or 
techniques. 
Funding Flexibility. Consideration of funding flexibility involved the project's 
effect on Mn/DOT' s program, capital flows and budget sizes, staffing, and issues 
surrounding appropriations for special projects versus appropriations for continuing 
operations. 
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Interview Participants 
Several different entities played a major role in ROC-52 project. The winning 
design-build team for the project was Zumbro River Constructors (ZRC), LLC-ajoint 
venture by Fluor Corporation, Ames Construction, Inc., and Edward Kraemer and Sons, Inc. 
HDR Corporation served as Mn/DOT's design-build oversight consultant for the project. 
Kleinfelder, Inc. handled materials testing responsibilities. URS Corporation also played a 
significant role as ZRC's designer for ROC-52. Key representatives from each of these 
organizations were interviewed, as well as several Mn/DOT project and District 6 personnel 
who were involved in the project. 
Interviewees were chosen with input from Terry Ward (Mn/DOT) and Doug Jackson 
(HDR) during a December 2004 meeting with the ISU research team. Interviewees were 
selected based on his or her role on ROC-52, as well as their familiarity with both design-
build and design-bid-build highway delivery methods. Each interviewee was believed to be 
able to provide insight into the delivery method's effect on most, if not all, of the project 
parameters. 
A total of 19 individuals participated in the ROC-52 case study interviews. A list of 
the participants is included in Appendix B. 
Data Collection from Interviews 
Interviews for the case study were conducted in a series of sessions in January and 
February of 2005 in Rochester, Minnesota. Each interview was scheduled to last 
approximately 45 minutes. The interview sessions were conducted by two members of the 
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ISU research team. Both interviewers recorded notes from the participants' responses, and 
interviews were tape-recorded for verification and accuracy assurance. 
Prior to the interviews, each participant was given a list of questions to be asked in 
the interviews. This list of questions is contained in Appendix A. 
Inclusion of the complete interview notes was decided to be impractical for this 
thesis. However, a table which summarizing the interviewees' responses has been included 
in Appendix C. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Administrative Costs 
A question related to the use of design-build on publicly-funded highway projects is 
how the use of a different delivery method affects the costs of administration. For clarity 
during the interviews, administrative costs were classified as those costs incurred to the 
agency in beyond those directly paid for design, construction, right-of-way, and other clearly 
defined project expenses. Mn/DOT' s administrative costs could include any of a variety of 
internal managerial or clerical expenditures, right-of-way acquisition processes, design 
reviews, and departmental contract administration costs. 
ROC-52 case study interviewees were asked to specifically identify the costs of 
administration on the project, to help define precisely which costs should be classified 
administrative costs, as well as to determine any additional administrative costs that were 
either less obvious or unique to this project. Several additional sources of administrative 
expense were suggested. Of the 19 individuals who had the opportunity to respond, at least 
six specifically identified HDR's role as the project's oversight consultant to be an additional 
administrative cost. Some saw HDR' s estimated $16. 7 Million contract as an added cost that 
would not be present on traditionally-delivered Mn/DOT projects, while other stated their 
belief that Mn/DOT would have assumed approximately the same expense if the oversight 
responsibilities performed by HDR had been retained by the agency. 
ROC-52 featured co-location of the design-build team and the owner-ZRC, 
Mn/DOT, HDR, and various consultants located their respective ROC-52 personnel in a 
rented office building in Rochester for the duration of the project. The cost to co-locate the 
collective project teams under one roof was often mentioned as an added administrative cost 
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unique to this project. Most of those who saw the cost of this office as an added expenditure 
also stated the belief that there was economic value in doing so. One reason this was seen as 
effective was because of the direct communication it facilitated between members of the 
different organizations. Co-location made it easier to track down project team members, 
arrange meetings, and resolve issues that arose. So although it was common to identify the 
cost of co-location in a separate office as an out-of-pocket administrative expense attributable 
to the design-build approach, it was also important to acknowledge possible savings derived 
from it. 
Development and implementation of the Request for Proposal process for best-value 
design-build was cited as an added administrative cost. The project's status as Mn/DOT's 
initial best-value design-build undertaking may have caused administrative expenses to be 
greater on ROC-52 than they would be on future projects of the same delivery method. The 
cost to develop the new RFP process and contractor selection procedure tailored to the best 
value approach was seen as a one-time expense which, once established, would only need 
minor modifications the next time it is used. 
Several interviewees mentioned document control as an additional or unique 
administrative cost to ROC-52. HDR staff was involved in the development of a database 
where project documents and reports were input, and the database was considered to be 
integral to Mn/DOT's document control for the entire project. The cost to develop and 
manage a new database for this design-build project would not be incurred on traditional 
Mn/DOT jobs. 
Overall, the responses gave no clear answer to the questions of if and how much 
administrative costs are different by delivery method. In general, the replies from project 
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personnel showed a high degree of uncertainty about how administrative costs may vary with 
different delivery systems. 
Of the 19 individuals questioned, seven contended that administrative costs were at 
least somewhat higher on design-build than they would have been under traditional. The 
explanations for why administrative costs may have been higher were numerous. Those who 
perceived administrative figure to be higher cited one or more of the additional costs 
previously noted-the co-located office, the HDR' s oversight contract, and development and 
implementation of the RFP and contractor selection process. Several people also stated that 
administrative costs may have been higher on ROC-52 simply because of the newness of 
using the design-build process on Mn/DOT projects. 
Another seven individuals suggested that costs were lower under design-build than 
they would have been otherwise. The reasons for those who believed administrative costs to 
be lower were less specific than those who said they were higher. The most common of 
these responses was that design-build's faster project timeline and single-contract delivery 
streamlined the project. 
Of the remaining five responses, three suggested they were the same and two had no 
opinion. Of the three who said they were the same, two qualified the response by noting that 
certain costs were higher and certain ones lower, but the resulting overall administrative cost 
was effectively not different. 
The interview responses offered no conclusive evidence whether administrative costs 
were higher or lower due to delivery method, and no conclusions or generalizations could be 
made. Mn/DOT provided additional cost data regarding administrative costs on a 
traditionally-delivered project, the W akota Bridge project in the southeastern Twin Cities 
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metropolitan area. The Wakota project was thought to be a possible comparison source since 
the cost of the project is of similar magnitude to ROC-52. This comparison was not used, 
however, due to significant differences in project scope, the municipalities involved, and the 
presence of other complicating factors such as litigation. 
Construction Costs 
Construction costs encompassed the amount established in the design-builder's 
original contract, which covered their share for engineering and design fees. The expense of 
changes to the project and cost growth over the life of the project was also a part of the 
construction cost. In discussing the comparative values of construction costs through 
different delivery methods, risk allocation also became an important consideration. 
Results of discussions with ROC-52 personnel suggested uncertainty about whether 
using design-build may have caused construction costs to be higher or lower. 14 of the 19 
interviewees commented on the construction cost criteria. Only one individual strongly 
believed ROC-52 construction costs were higher under design-build than they would have 
been otherwise, and only two strongly believed they were lower. The remaining 11 
responses were qualified with uncertainty or ambiguity: 6 said they might be lower, 2 said 
they might be higher, 2 said they were the same, and 1 said it was unclear. 
A pair of reasons-cost growth reduction and overall time savings-was mentioned 
by nearly all interviewees who believed construction costs to be lower on ROC-52 and on 
design-build projects in general. The design-build process brought a reduction of change 
orders, both in number and in overall dollar amount. Some cost growth typically arises on 
construction projects from scope changes, unforeseen environmental conditions, and other 
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factors. Cost growth on ROC-52 was calculated to be 2.61% at the time of the interviews. 
The typical Mn/DOT target for cost growth on design-bid-build projects was around 7 
percent, and the average Mn/DOT cost growth on projects from the years 1998 through 2002 
was approximately 9 percent. The comparison of these numbers made the ROC-52 cost 
growth figure appear favorable, and was probably the most convincing indicator to those who 
believed that the project saved over traditional means. Several who believed costs were 
reduced by design-build also cited inflationary savings from faster construction, although 
quantitative substantiation of this belief was not provided. 
The most commonly mentioned reason construction costs may have been higher was 
the increased risk to the design-builder. Design-build contractors are subject to more 
economic risk, largely because they hold responsibility to reconcile design errors. An 
individual from the design-build team estimated that up-front construction costs on other 
projects may be 5 to 10 percent more on design-build. Depending on the cost reduction 
experienced from the decrease in change orders on the project, the final figure for 
construction may have been slightly higher by design-build. 
The issue of risk allocation in design-build makes for a complicated comparison to 
the design-bid-build system. It was noted that on ROC-52, however, that at least one area of 
risk assignment probably helped to reduce cost growth and help lower costs from what they 
may have been otherwise. Upon parcel acquisition for the project, Mn/DOT was faced with 
numerous environmental conditions, including 79 existing buildings requiring asbestos 
removal and 15 more possible areas of environmental contamination. Rather than having the 
design-builder include absorb this risk in their bid, the RFP allowed Mn/DOT to retain the 
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risk and simply pay for the changes. Estimates from interviewees projected the cost savings 
from this decision to be as much as $3 to $4 Million. 
Several interviewees discussed the processes for attaining quality on a project as one 
factor that drove costs higher on ROC-52. Quality control (QC) was maintained by ZRC, 
while the quality assurance (QA) responsibilities were retained by the owner in the form of 
an oversight consultant, HDR. Some mentioned the contractor having added QC staff for the 
project that constituted an additional overhead expense in the original bid. Others saw QC 
and QA as a duplication of efforts. Perceptions regarding this issue are discussed in greater 
detail in the Quality of Project section. 
Another possible added cost for the original bid on ROC-52 was for the design-
builder' s handling of public relations and community outreach. ZRC handled public 
relations exclusively and through a single point of contact, which has not been the 
arrangement on traditional projects. ZRC earned a $100,000 incentive for handling public 
relations on the project. 
The ROC-52 personnel interviewed were generally hesitant to say construction costs 
were clearly higher or lower; many of those interviewed, including those who believed either 
higher or lower, conceded there was no way to tell for sure. Opinions on how costs vary by 
the delivery system frequently came down to perceptions about how the systems themselves 
vary and how costs disparities in certain areas may be compensated for in other areas. Risk 
was the most often mentioned of these considerations, but there were several others. 
Since risk is higher to the contractor on design-build projects, it was expected there is 
an adjustment in the bid compared to traditional to account for the increased exposure. A 
strength of the design-build method is the greater flexibility it allows allocating risk to the 
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party who most suited to accept it. During the planning phase of the project, the Department 
identified several key areas of risk and subsequently included related materials and data in 
the RFP. Other areas of risk including quality and schedule can be placed on the design-
builder. The result is that risk is assigned so differently than in design-bid-build projects, 
first costs of construction and costs of changes are apt to be different. It became difficult to 
make reasonable comparisons regarding construction costs between the traditional and 
design-build methods. 
Time 
Discussion about project time effects resulting from design-build delivery was one-
sided on ROC-52. Perhaps the most commonly recognized advantage of design-build, time 
was a performance parameter widely acknowledged as one of the primary reasons for its use 
on the project. 
Original projections under design-bid-build had the scope of Rochester Highway 52 
corridor reconstruction broken into as many as 15 separate stages spanning more than 11 
years to completion. An aggressive schedule and significant reduction in time was of major 
importance on the project, driven by feedback received from the community and the 
Economic Impact Study by the City of Rochester and Mn/DOT's District 6. Once design-
build materialized as the means for delivering the project, construction time was reduced 
down to five years-from the project letting on November 1, 2002 to the RFP required 
completion date ofNovember 1, 2007. The design-builder's schedule projected completion 
in Fall of 2006, a year ahead of the required timeline. Official project completion was 
celebrated in October of 2005, a year earlier than projected. 
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As expected, all participants in the ROC-52 interviews said design-build delivery 
reduces the time for project compared to traditional. There were several reasons, both 
apparent and less obvious, for why project's duration was reduced by the use of design-build 
delivery. 
The most commonly mentioned reason for why design-build can save time over the 
traditional process was the ability for design and construction to partially overlap. In design-
build, this can effectively be a three-phase process: first, there is a period of design only 
when preliminary design considerations are addressed; second, preliminary construction 
activities get underway as the plans near completion; third, construction only continues to 
completion after the plans have been finished. 
Time savings were realized from certain processes in highway construction which 
take a significant amount of time but which do not necessarily require a completed plan set. 
The time-consuming removal of existing pavement or preparation of subgrade for the new 
highway were two examples of tasks mentioned which did not require a completed and 
finalized plan set for work to begin. 
Another common explanation for why design-build created time savings on ROC-52 
was simply its enabling of a project of its size and scope. The process of letting the 
reconstruction as many separate projects rather than a single one would have been schedule 
prohibitive. Design-build also allowed the use of alternative funding vehicles, including 
Federal Accelerated Construction support, which helped to secure future federal funding in 
advance to help enable completion of the project in a timely manner. ROC-52 simply could 
not have been built in 5 years-if at all-under Mn/DOT's traditional design-bid-build 
system. 
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Design-build also saved time on ROC-52 because it promoted pre-letting contractor 
involvement more than any other contracting method. Once the design-build process was 
initiated and Request for Qualifications (RFQ) was issued for the project, four teams 
submitted Statements of Qualifications (SOQ) and all were included in the Department's 
"short list" of teams from which proposals would be accepted. After these steps were taken, 
the four proposing teams became involved in the process in a way that does not occur prior to 
letting of traditional jobs. Teams submitted innovative technologies, termed Alternative 
Technical Concepts (ATCs), to the seven-member ROC-52 Technical Review Committee for 
evaluation, and then scored the four teams' proposals. One ATC used by ZRC on the 
project-mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) retaining walls-was said by personnel from 
both contractor and owner to have reduced the schedule by approximately one year (the ATC 
process is discussed in greater detail in the Innovation section later in this Chapter). 
Getting potential contractors involved earlier meant that Mn/DOT had more time to 
evaluate and approve innovations, while the contractor could have valuable interaction about 
the project with the owner. Both sides had a clear idea of expectations earlier on in the 
process, and this favorably impacted the builders' plans, including their ability to commit 
equipment and resources, to use innovative technologies to save time and money, and to use 
sequencing and methods that allow them to build the project as efficiently as possible. This 
process added some time to the project planning phase, but many believed it saved a 
considerable amount of time over the course of the project. 
Other ROC-52 individuals indicated that the nature of the plans themselves was a 
source of time savings. As one pointed out, design-build offered "more flexibility in the 
design document deliverable." The distinction between plans being "bidable" on a 
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traditional job versus "buildable" on design-build projects was a central point. Individuals 
from the contractor side of the project asserted that projects can be built to the expected level 
of quality and performance without the level of detail required in a traditional DOT plan set. 
They believed design-build plans can be completed faster and with less emphasis on details, 
and still produce a finished product identical to traditional in less time. 
Management Complexity 
As a performance parameter to evaluate design-build, management complexity 
encompassed wide array of issues. Management of any portion of the project could bring 
potential challenges, whether during the stages of planning, procurement, design and 
engineering, preconstruction or construction. Those interviewed for the ROC-52 case study 
included many of the managers of day-to-day activities of the project. The objective of this 
portion of the interviews was to be able to identify what areas of the project brought the 
highest levels of management complexity, and determine ifROC-52 was more or less 
complex from a management perspective based on the delivery method. 
Of the 19 interviewees, 11 stated that management of the project was at least 
somewhat more complex than what would be expected of a traditional project of similar 
scope. The remaining individuals believed the differences in management complexity to be 
either ambiguous or too difficult to compare. 
One of the most fundamental reasons why many believed design-build projects to 
present a higher level of managerial challenges was simply the newness of the system. 
Being Mn/DOT's first large-scale best-value design-build project meant that from the start of 
ROC-52, new processes were developed and used. At the start of the project, a new 
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approach to accepting and evaluating proposals was implemented, and included new 
considerations such as short-listing teams, institution of the ATC process, and using the best-
value scoring approach to evaluating the proposals differently than traditional projects. As 
the project progressed, different ways of integrating design and construction, relating to the 
public, and managing quality were among notable departures from the traditional system. 
The newness of each of these different methods made management responsibilities more 
challenging, because, as one interviewee put it, it represented a full "culture shift." 
A point of management complexity mentioned by individuals from both the design-
build team and the owner side of the project was the role and authority of the project 
managers themselves. Both sides asserted that design-build project managers must be given 
the authority and trust by their respective agencies to make decisive judgments about issues 
that arise. By all accounts, this seemed to have been handled well on ROC-52. Project 
managers representing both sides were given the power to make decisions about project 
issues without requiring escalation to greater levels of management. The belief was 
expressed that the people in charge at the project level have an ideal combination of specific 
project knowledge and professional experience and skill, and therefore need to be relied upon 
make decisions; in design-build projects where time is such a critical factor, swift and 
decisive problem resolution is essential to keeping things moving forward. 
A primary reason for uncertain on whether design-build brought increased 
management complexity was the difficulty of separating the complexity of the delivery 
system from the complexity of the project itself. Several stated that complexity is more a 
function of the specific project rather than an issue of traditional versus design-build 
delivery. The project or projects that would have comprised ROC-52 under the traditional 
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system would have likely shared many of the same complexities-a large-scale urban 
reconstruction, complicated staging scenarios, difficult traffic maintenance requirements, as 
well as many of the same coordination issues with right-of-way, utilities, or environmental 
concerns. These issues were not viewed as being exclusive to design-build. 
Disruptions to Third Parties 
A project with the scope ofROC-52 could occur without affecting many parts of the 
community. Businesses, residential neighborhoods, schools, and churches were among the 
third parties whose routines were subject to disturbances from the construction. The 
objective of this performance area was to determine how disruptions to third parties may 
have differed, either greater or less, under the design-build system. 
Of 17 interviewees who offered feedback regarding third party disruptions, 15 stated 
that disruptions during the construction were less because of design-build. The remaining 
two respondents were uncertain or believed disruptions to be no different than they would 
otherwise have been under traditional contracting practices. No interviewees believed 
disruptions to the community to be greater under design-build delivery. 
A common reason why people believed disruptions to third parties to be less on ROC-
52 was the handling of public relations (PR). An incentive-based contract provision gave PR 
responsibilities to ZRC, making them the exclusive point of contact for the public over the 
life of the project. Although a provision of this extent is not typically included in the 
contract, even for design-build, many of those interviewed considered the PR handling on 
ROC-52 to be a major success. 
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On traditional projects, as one interviewee explained, "The DOT or the DOT' s 
consultant interacts with the public as a go-between with the contractor." Here, the design-
builder maintained direct contact with the public, an arrangement believed to be 
advantageous for several reasons. First, the direct interaction eliminates time delay or 
confusion that occurs from the public-DOT-contractor communication relay. Second, having 
a single and exclusive PR point of contact, as ZRC did, greatly reduced any mixed messages 
or contradictory information that could occur if PR duties were shared. Finally, having direct 
contact with the public forced the design-builder to provide a different level of 
accountability. With no buffering organization, the design-builder had responsibility to 
maintain its own good reputation by being responsive to the public's concerns. Several 
individuals expressed the opinion that the design-builder acted with a greater sense of 
urgency under this arrangement. 
The use of multiple media outlets to provide comprehensive and up-to-date travel 
information was also considered valuable. The contractor made effective use of local 
television and radio outlets, a project website, and a "1-800" project phone line as well. The 
public was kept current on the status of the project, with particular emphasis on specific ramp 
closures and detour routes that affected travel. 
Third party impacts were also thought to be reduced greatly by having a shorter 
project lifespan. The period of impact is much shorter versus what it would have been under 
the original design-bid-build plan. Some suggested that the public perceived impacts much 
more favorably on ROC-52 because their expectations for disruptions were so much worse. 
During construction of the project, design-build was said to have given the contractor 
more flexibility to minimize disruptions by making it easier to make changes to plans and 
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processes. Timing and planning of construction activities, detour routes, and traffic control 
were just a few notable areas where changes were made to accommodate the public. Some 
of the following examples illustrated how this flexibility was used by the design-build team. 
• ZRC made what was said to be an uncommon effort to accommodate an elementary 
school near the 6th Street bridge in the central region of the project. ZRC worked closely 
with the Rochester School District to coordinate its period of closure to minimize the 
effect to Folwell Elementary School. They altered their schedule to open the bridge at 
least 6 months ahead of the original plan; meanwhile, they erected a temporary pedestrian 
bridge and paid the school district for additional busing needs arising from the 
construction. 
• On Halloween evening of 2003, parents from the neighborhoods around the 2nd Street 
and 6th Street raised concerns about the scheduled 8:00 PM demolition of the two 
bridges. The parents said that their children would be trick-or-treating after 8:00 PM in 
neighborhoods on the other side of Highway 52 and were counting on the bridges to get 
back home. The contractor responded by delaying the demolition until I 0:00 PM that 
evening to accommodate these families. The contractor's direct interaction and greater 
accountability to the public was believed to have been a significant factor in their 
willingness to change the schedule of a demolition event to oblige a relatively small 
group of residents on Halloween. 
• ZRC's construction work on a frontage road in the corridor prompted a call from a doctor 
employed by a Mayo Clinic hospital. The woman's work hours at the hospital were 
during the night, and during the day she slept at her apartment. At one point during 
construction, noise from trucks and equipment prevented her from sleeping. The 
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contractor's response to the complaint was decisive and generous: they changed the haul 
routes of the trucks and directed noise away from the doctor's apartment complex. 
Road User Costs 
Road user costs (RU Cs) are incurred by motorists as a result of construction projects. 
The determination of road user costs puts a value on driver travel time, delays, accidents, 
additional vehicle mileage from detour routes, and other factors. Most DOTs have their own 
method for estimating road user costs for projects. 
The interview responses gave some qualitative impressions about the impact of 
design-build on road user costs. Many of the individuals interviewed did not have sufficient 
knowledge or felt unable to comment about road user costs. Six people believed road user 
costs to be reduced as a result of design-build; five said they were either the same, or that the 
impact on road user costs from delivery method was unclear. 
The primary explanation for why road user costs may have been lower in design-
build was the reduction in time to complete the project. Most interviewees believed the same 
types RUCs would occur for the same scope of work regardless of delivery method. 
Consequently, since RU Cs were accumulated only while the project was in progress, 
intuitively they were expected to be lower for a project of shorter duration. 
The reasoning was similar for the interviewees who believed RUCs would not be 
different regardless of delivery method. Their argument was that the same costs occur either 
way, regardless of duration of the project. Unfortunately, the responses to the questions of 
road user costs were not clear or insightful, as many felt they did not know enough to make 
an assertion one way or the other. 
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Interviewees noted that the Economic Impact Analysis from 2000 contained 
information about traveler and business costs on ROC-52. This consultant study looked at 
four different staging alternatives for the Highway 52 corridor reconstruction, before the 
decision to use design-build was made. The four alternatives considered in the study were 4-
year, 5-year, 7-year, and 11-year scenarios (Staging, 2001). It is worth mentioning that 
several significant scope changes were made to the project in the time after the economic 
study was completed and before the procurement phase was initiated. 
Traveler costs and retail transfer were the two parameters evaluated in the Economic 
Impact Analysis. Of the four alternatives, the lowest projected dollar amounts in both 
traveler and retail impacts was the 11-year alternative; however, this option was not 
considered because of the prohibitive timeline, project fragmentation, public dissatisfaction, 
and reasons previously discussed. The most costly alternative was the 7-year scenario. The 
second-lowest option was the 5-year plan, and this helped provided the basis for Mn/DOT 
targeting a five-year construction timeline. 
The 4-year option was the second most costly scenario for both traveler costs and 
retail transfer. Although it was the shortest plan, the 4-year option was problematic for other 
reasons. Unlike the other options, the 4-year option would have required full closure of 
Highway 52 for two years. This would not have been realistic because of the lack of 
alternative roadway facilities to accommodate traffic demands through the city. This left the 
5-year and 7-year plans as the two most plausible alternatives for the reconstruction. 
For the sake of comparison regarding road user costs, consider the two most favorable 
staging alternatives-the 5-year and 7-year plans. The study estimated the traveler costs for 
the 5-year option to be approximately $80 Million; the estimated traveler costs in the 7-year 
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option were $150 Million (Staging, pp. 3-4). Consequently, for each year of schedule 
reduction, an estimated $35 Million in traveler costs was saved. Savings ofthis magnitude 
suggests that there was significant economic value for the traveling public from the reduction 
of schedule even between the two best options considered by the study. The actual value of 
this reduction in traveler costs (and retail transfer) would likely be even greater considering 
the actual execution of the project. With the final construction being completed in 
approximately three years, and with the final construction cost being more than 50% greater 
than considered in the 2000 study ($232 Million versus $150 million), the actual road user 
cost reduction to the public would have been even greater than anticipated. 
Quality of Project 
The quality performance parameter was a key issue on ROC-52. Quality referred to 
workmanship and performance of the final product and how these factors compare to the 
owner's expectations. Over the course of the case study interviews, quality emerged as the 
most contentious issue during the construction phase of the project. 
A considerable amount of the discussion regarding ROC-52 centered on the processes 
used to achieve quality, rather than the actual quality of the final product. The issues raised 
about quality during the interviews were not about whether it was being sufficiently attained 
through design-build. Instead, the focus was on the appropriateness of the owner's approach 
to the processes of quality control and quality assurance. 
The interviews revealed little doubt that ROC-52 has been a project of good quality. 
Seven interviewees said quality was better on ROC-52 than they would expect on a 
traditional project of the same scope. The remaining ten responses indicated that quality was 
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the same as what would be expected on traditional projects. No one believed quality to have 
been less than what traditional delivery would produce. 
Several reasons were offered for why quality was superior. A number believed 
quality to be better on ROC-52 because the contractors have been inclined to put their best 
and most experienced personnel on design-build projects, often because design-build projects 
tend to be higher-profile, of greater dollar value, and with having higher risk. There was 
some sentiment that quality performance is even more crucial for a contractor to succeed in 
design-build delivery than in design-bid-build. Because owners of best-value design-build 
projects often put a greater emphasis on quality rather than exclusively the "bottom line" low 
bid, it is more important for design-builders to have an established track record for producing 
quality projects to help secure future design-build contracts. 
Some said that redundancy of quality processes on ROC-52 helped to create a more 
quality project. The project was unlike the traditional system where processes to guarantee 
quality are reserved to the DOT. With the contractor handling quality control 
responsibilities, and HDR serving as Mn/DOT's oversight consultant responsible for quality 
assurance, some personnel believed the presence of twice as many eyes helped guarantee 
material and process specifications were met. 
Most of the interviewees believed that product quality and workmanship on the 
project would have been the same regardless of delivery process used. Several comments 
were made that product quality has more to do the capabilities and commitment of the 
contractor and Mn/DOT field inspectors than with contract method. On ROC-52, 
participants generally had praise for both the designer-builder and the Mn/DOT and HDR 
personnel regarding their understanding of and commitment to quality workmanship. 
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As mentioned, there were a number of problems related to quality processes on ROC-
52. Most of these problems stemmed from confusion about decision-making authority and 
quality responsibilities between the design-builder and the Mn/DOT/HDR oversight team. 
On ROC-52, ZRC held the responsibilities for quality control (QC), while Mn/DOT via HDR 
handled quality assurance (QA). This was problematic, as it was a departure from the 
traditional arrangement where Mn/DOT would have handled QC responsibilities. 
One example of where the new quality responsibilities were problematic involved 
soils used for subgrade fill material. The HDR oversight representative responsible for QA 
noted excessive clay in the soil and informed the field representative of the design-builder 
that the fill material was not acceptable. This QA function was appropriate. However, the 
QA representative then told the design-builder to halt all incoming trucks from the borrow 
site and stop work on that section of the roadway. This declaration extended beyond the 
authority of a QA oversight field representative. Remedy of the quality failure was the 
responsibility of the design-builder, and they hold the authority to determine the method of 
correction. In the case mentioned above, there were several dozen trucks in queue from the 
borrow site, and returning the material while stopping work until a new borrow site was 
located would have had serious cost and schedule implications for the design-builder. A 
solution to the problem was devised, but not without some difficulties in establishing 
authority. 
In addition, several interviewees noted that the duplication of effort in quality 
processes led to inefficient use of project resources. Specific examples were not given, but 
the nature of the discussions seemed to imply that there was too much oversight in the field 
and too much redundancy in the system. The use of the traditionally prescriptive 
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specifications was inconsistent with design-build quality processes, which should focus 
primarily on performance outcomes. 
Overall, the participants in the case study interviews believed that most of the 
problems associated with quality processes were a result of the newness of the design-build 
processes and roles, and that the situation would improve as Mn/DOT personnel became 
more familiar with design-build delivery. In fact, several respondents commented that the 
quality process issues improved substantially over the course of the ROC 52 project. 
Innovation 
Interviewees were unanimous in the opinion that use of design-build led to more 
innovation on the ROC-52 project than would have been possible under traditional delivery. 
In particular, the method used for submittal, review, and approval of Alternative Technical 
Concepts (ATCs) was particularly beneficial on the ROC 52 project. Several improvements 
in efficiency and reductions in cost, schedule, or third-part impacts were made possible 
through the introduction of A TCs by the design-builder. 
The ROC-52 ATC process was seen one of the unique and advantageous aspects of 
the design-build process. Initially during the RFP phase, the four teams preparing ROC-52 
proposals viewed Mn/DOT's specifications for the project as overly restrictive for the 
design-build environment. The teams, based on experience with other design-build projects 
highway projects, had come to expect specifications which were less prescriptive and more 
"performance-based." The fundamental difference between prescriptive and performance-
based specifications is that the former dictates specific methods and steps, while the latter 
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allows flexibility and innovation in the way of materials, methods, and systems as long as 
required end results are met. 
Mn/DOT considered the sentiments of the four proposing teams about the lack of 
innovation allowed under the initial RFP. Mn/DOT's ROC-52 Project Team looked at how 
other DOTs had addressed this issue on design-build projects. Typically on these projects, an 
innovative concept would be presented by a proposing party, reviewed by the owner, and if 
approved, the concept would be shared with all proposing teams. Mn/DOT chose a different 
approach to this part of the process because they felt that sharing the approved innovative 
concepts between teams removed the incentive and economic advantage for each team to 
develop them. Instead, teams were permitted to submit new concepts to satisfy the RFP' s 
performance requirements, but these ATCs were kept confidential prior to letting. There 
were also four project areas Mn/DOT determined to have specific requirements that would 
not be conducive to any ATC submittals-right-of-way, ITS, pavement structure, and 
aesthetics. ATCs were not considered in these four areas. 
The four proposing teams were allowed up to five meetings with Mn/DOT project 
staff to discuss ideas and obtain feedback. The teams were invited to submit innovative 
concepts for review, upon which Mn/DOT would decide to accept, conditionally accept, or 
reject the proposed ATC. Overall, 100 ATCs were received from the four teams. Of these, 9 
were fully approved and 39 were conditionally approved. The topics covered in the ATC 
submittals were varied, but the most common were said to include roadway geometrics, walls 
and bridges, and maintenance of traffic. 
It was stated that ZRC reduced their bid price by as much as $4 Million by being 
allowed to use ATCs they had proposed. The most significant ATC in terms of savings was 
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the use of different wall systems, particularly mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) retaining 
walls, which replaced the more costly and time-consuming cast-in-place cantilevered wall 
included in the original RFP requirements. This change alone was said by ZRC to have 
reduced the schedule by one year, a cost savings that is additional to $4 Million already 
mentioned. Other successful ATCs mentioned were the use of rock-cut material as median 
fill on the south end of the project, flexible traffic maintenance plans through the corridor, 
and an alignment shift to help facilitate construction of the interchange at US Highway 14. 
The use of more performance-based specifications was believed by many to be 
crucial to the design-build process because it can enable innovation that can save time and 
money. The primary concern may be making sure that the owner's expectations are clear. 
As one interviewee put it, "the owner may be expecting a Mercedes-Benz, while the 
contractor sees a Volkswagen." The ATC process used on ROC-52 worked to minimize 
these types of problems by getting both sides involved in dialogue during the RFP phase, 
having a structured procedure for approving or conditionally approving the ATCs, and 
having areas of the project that were off-limits to ATCs. Still, performance-based 
specifications are appropriate for many situations, and all of those interviewed seemed to 
realize their importance to the success of projects such as this one. The ability of the 
contractor to use innovative concepts and have more flexibility is essential to design-build 
projects, and the belief seems united that the ATC process was successful on ROC-52. 
Funding Flexibility 
Funding issues and related political matters were the most difficult to gather 
information about on the ROC-52 project and case study. A majority of respondents stated 
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that they did not sufficient knowledge of the situation to comment on funding issues related 
to the use of design-build. However, there were 4-5 interviews with Mn/DOT administrative 
and District 6 personnel that gave some insight into these complex funding matters. 
The recurring theme from the funding-related interviews was that using design-build 
required a drastic change in the approach to financing transportation infrastructure. One 
interviewee stated, "You can't have innovative contracting without innovative funding; they · 
go hand-in-hand." The cornerstone of the innovative funding program that made ROC-52 
possible was the 2003 Bond Acceleration Program that made slightly more than 
$400,000,000 available for construction projects in Minnesota under the Trunk Highway 
Bonding Authority. The $400,000,000 in debt financing allowed the state to leverage an 
additional $400,000,000 plus in Federal Accelerated Construction (F AC) authority to 
accelerate trunk highway improvements throughout the state. The net result was funding of 
seventeen major highway projects scheduled to be delivered more than 60 years ahead of 
their original schedules. 
The details of transportation program financing exceeded the scope of this research 
effort. It was worth noting that the consequences-negative and positive-resulting from the 
decision to accelerate construction. The negative consequences included loss of additional 
FAC dollars until 2009 and the temporary reduction of Mn/DOT cash balances to historical 
low points. The reduction in cash balances was due to some of the peculiarities of the F AC 
program. The F AC program fund processing requires 30 days for reimbursable on matches, 
compared to seven days for conventional federal funding. At times, this delay put a strain on 
cash reserves for major projects. 
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Since many of Mn/DOT' s operational issues such as design, quality control, 
inspections, and public relations were included in the design-builder's contract on ROC-52, 
capital operational budgets have needed resolution. Mn/DOT has also had to work out 
staffing issues created by this dilemma. The construction program in District 6 will be 
smaller in future years because of the need to pay for the acceleration ofROC-52, and the 
process of district personnel returning to operating budget lines upon the project completion 
is uncertain. Concern was also expressed that maintenance programs in District 6 could 
suffer as a result of the acceleration of ROC 52. 
On the positive side, the strain on cash flows created by accelerated construction 
projects like ROC-52 led Mn/DOT to develop their Cash Forecasting Information Tool 
(CFIT), which will enable better forecasting and analysis of Departmental cash flows. 
Increased sophistication in fund management is one of the secondary benefits of the use of 
design-build for ROC-52. Other improvements have been made to accounting, procurement, 
program and project management systems, and project information and document controls. 
Accelerating construction projects under a design-build delivery system did put a 
strain on Mn/DOT's cash fund balances, and contributed to some significant future 
challenges. However, the use of design-build allowed Mn/DOT to receive advance funding 
from FAC dollars to make ROC-52 a reality, while still helping to maintain a functional and 
sustainable District operations budget. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
ROC-52 has been widely praised as a major success by project personnel, the public, 
and the local media. Of the performance parameters considered in this research, several--
time, disruptions to third parties, road user costs, innovation-seem to have clear advantages 
under the design-build system. Others such as management complexity, quality, and 
financial flexibility, have both merits and drawbacks. 
Conclusions 
Administrative Costs. Delivery method's effect on administrative costs was 
inconclusive. ROC-52 interviewees offered widely varying suggestions but pointed to no 
clear conclusion regarding administrative costs. Suggestions were made of possible 
differences in administrative costs between the two systems-cost of co-location, the HDR 
oversight contract, development of new procedures during the procurement phase. However, 
no clear consensus emerged from their responses. The ambiguity about administrative costs 
was consistent with design-build literature and with recommendations of Keith Molenaar. 
Construction Costs. The effect of delivery method on total construction costs was 
unclear based on interview responses. It was generally believed to be very difficult to 
compare the two systems objectively because risk-a key, inherent economic element of the 
bid-is handled quite differently in design-build than in design-bid-build. The way risk is 
allocated on projects of different delivery methods would have made for a murky and 
potentially invalid comparison. Interviewees indicated that cost growth on ROC-52 was 
lower than rates common on traditional projects, however. The estimated ROC-52 cost 
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growth figure of 2.6% did bear this out. Overall, design-build appears to be competitive with 
design-bid-build in terms of construction costs. 
Time. Without question, the time performance parameter was favorable under 
design-build. All project personnel interviewed for this study agreed that using design-build 
has facilitated a markedly quicker project. A considerable portion of the design and 
construction phases of design-build projects are able to take place simultaneously. Scope-
related design changes occur less frequently and can be reconciled more dynamically, as the 
risk and accountability for design accuracy and schedule adherence falls squarely on the 
design-builder. Design-build brings contractors into the process prior to letting, allowing 
them to explore time-saving options for construction, as evidenced by the A TC process on 
ROC-52. Using design-build on ROC-52 was credited largely with having reduced the 
reconstruction timeline from more than a decade by traditional delivery down to 
approximately 3 years. 
Management Complexity. ROC-52 interviews suggested that the design-build 
process has brought greater management challenges. At least some of the additional 
complexity must be attributed to the newness of the process, a retooled approach to 
procurement, greater levels of complexity and integration in scheduling design and 
construction, and having to change roles and responsibilities on the project. However, the 
management complexity of a project also has much to do with the nature of the project itself. 
The fact that ROC-52 and other such large and complicated projects tend to be the ones that 
become candidates for design-build delivery obscured some of the complexity attributed to 
the delivery method. Overall, ROC-52 was believed to have been somewhat more 
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complicated to manage, partly because it was delivered design-build, and partly because it is 
a large and challenging project-regardless of delivery system. 
Disruptions to Third Parties. A 15-of-17 majority believed that disruptions to third 
parties were less on ROC-52 as a result of design-build; two others believed they were no 
different, and no one believed them to be greater. The decision to have the design-builder 
have complete and singular responsibility for public relations on the project was considered 
highly successful. It eliminated the possibility of contradictory information from multiple 
sources and expedited the communication process. Moreover, it held the design-builder 
more directly accountable to the public than having Mn/DOT relay information or concerns 
between the public and contractor as on traditional projects. 
Road User Costs. Interviewees' perceptions about the economic concept of road 
user costs were inconclusive. The majority of those who offered an opinion believed RUCs 
were reduced as a result of design-build simply because the length of the project and 
exposure to impacts was greatly reduced. The ROC-52 Economic Impact Analysis addressed 
RUCs and business impacts and suggested a 5-year maximum timeline. The report arrived 
prior to ROC-52's selection for design-build and subsequent scope changes. 
Quality. Acceptable quality was achieved on ROC-52, as all interview participants 
believed it was as good as or better than what would be expected under a design-bid-build 
scenario. However, the system of achieving quality was problematic. There were 
disagreements between design-builder and owner representatives about decision-making 
authority involving quality matters. Some also believed quality efforts were inefficient and 
unnecessarily redundant. Quality processes in design-build require a change of roles versus 
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traditional. Many felt that these difficulties improved over the life of the project as 
individuals were acclimated to new roles and responsibilities. 
Innovation. Innovation was unanimously believed to have been better on ROC-52 as 
a result of design-build. Specifically, the Alternative Technical Concepts process fostered a 
productive pre-letting exchange between design-builder, which ultimately led to the use of 
valuable design and construction concepts which were new to Mn/DOT projects. The 
resulting approved ATCs allowed for the integration of several innovations that saved 
considerable amounts of time and money. Some felt that the process could evolve even more 
in the future, with a greater shift from prescriptive to performance-based specifications. 
Funding Flexibility. Use of design-build on ROC-52 required the use of some 
different funding mechanisms, including debt financing and Federal Accelerated 
Construction dollars. Design-build delivery enabled Mn/DOT to complete the Highway 52 
corridor reconstruction without jeopardizing District 6 operations budgets, but the funding 
arrangement has also brought some challenges. The most notable of these were reduction in 
future funding, strains on Departmental cash balances, and staffing complications during and 
after the project. 
Recommendations for Future Design-Build Projects 
Based on experiences on ROC-52, the following specific measures are recommended 
for future projects of similar scale utilizing design-build delivery: 
• Use caution in making any cost-related comparisons between the design-build and 
design-bid-build delivery methods. Major differences like risk allocation make objective 
comparison very difficult. 
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• The value of faster construction should be a key factor in the selection of future projects 
for design-build. Design-build is especially favorable for saving time on complex 
corridor-type projects such as ROC-52. 
• Co-location of staff offices of the design-builder and the owner is advisable. This is very 
valuable in creating effective communication and a team-based approach. 
• Designation of public relations to a single point of contact is recommended. The design-
builder' s contractual PR incentive was a successful on ROC-52. 
• Increased use of performance-based specifications on design-build projects should be 
considered by Mn/DOT to take full advantage of the potential for innovation offered by 
the design-build delivery. 
• On design-build projects, a distinction between "bidable" and "buildable" plans should be 
recognized. A plan set for a design-build highway project does not necessarily require 
the traditional level of comprehensiveness to be constructed. 
• Project managers from Mn/DOT and from the design-builder should be trusted with 
decision making authority. Design-build requires decisive and timely issue resolution. 
• Processes for quality control and quality assurance must be clearly understood by all 
parties at the onset of construction. These processes must be carried out according to the 
plan. 
• A procedure to approve innovations, such as the ATCs, should be utilized early in the 
design-build process. This can allow Mn/DOT to take fuller advantage of a design-
builder' s particular ideas and skills, and can have positive ramifications on cost and 
schedule. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Administrative Costs 
• What are some examples of internal (Mn/DOT) administrative costs on ROC-52? 
• If ROC-52 had been adm~nistered using Mn/DOT's traditional delivery system of design-
bid-build, would Mn/DOT's internal costs have been higher, lower, or the same? If 
different, specifically which types of internal costs would change? 
• How did actual processes associated with these administrative costs differ on this design-
build project from how they typically would be under projects of traditional delivery? 
Construction Costs 
• How would construction costs have been different if the project had used traditional 
delivery rather than design-build-higher, lower, or the same? Why? 
• Are there other construction costs besides those mentioned (first costs, engineering and 
design, change costs)? 
• If there are others, are they attributable to the type of delivery system used on this 
project? 
Time 
• Would the length of time spent in each of these project phases have been higher, lower, 
or the same under the traditional delivery method? 
• How significant would the difference have been? 
• Are there other factors that affect project time? 
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Management Complexity 
• Was there difficulty understanding the scope or defining the project? 
• If so, would this have been different under the traditional system? 
• Was the project easier, more difficult, or equally as difficult to manage due to its status as 
design-build rather than traditional? 
• Specifically, which areas of the project were more difficult to manage? (procurement 
processes, utility conflicts, ROW turnover, phasing, etc.) 
• What were the logistical concerns with executing the project, and would they have been 
different under the traditional system? 
Disruptions to Third Parties 
• Are there other specific examples of third parties impacted by the project? What were 
the impacts? 
• How did ROC-52's design-build delivery method affect the way disruptions to third 
parties were handled? Did the design-build system improve, hinder, or have no effect on 
how third-party impacts were managed or remedied? 
• What was the disruption to residents or neighbors? Railroad crossings? Facilities or 
structures along the route? 
• Were there environmental issues on the project? Were there any differences in the way 
they were dealt with stemming from the use of design-build instead of traditional? 
Road User Costs 
• Are there other types of road user costs which were unique to the ROC-52 Project? 
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• Would these costs have been higher, lower, or no different under the traditional system 
instead of design build? 
Quality of Project 
• How has design-build impacted the overall quality of the project? 
• Are there any specific examples of how quality was different under design-build than 
expected under the traditional system?· 
• What do you think the long-term effects will be in terms of workmanship, warranty, 
contractor call-backs, ongoing maintenance, and other quality-related issues? 
Innovation 
• How does the design-build system allow for changes to be made on the project? 
• Does design-build promote or discourage contractor innovation, and to what extent? 
• What were some specific examples of innovation on the project, if any? 
• If applicable, in what areas is innovation made possible? Design? Methods? 
Sequencing? Other areas? 
Funding Flexibility 
• To what degree does design-build create different options for funding flexibility? 
• Are projects easier to fund than operations? (use of capital budgets versus operating 
appropriations for design, inspections, etc.) 
• Is the impact significant or minimal? 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEWEES FOR ROC-52 CASE STUDY 
Name Organization Title 
Karl Anderson Mn/DOT Materials Specialist 
Sim Brubaker HDR Field Services Manager 
Jim Eshbaugh URS Design Manager 
·Craig Glazier HDR Segment 1 Construction Engineer 
Tanya Houska HDR Financial Budget Manager 
Trinity Houska HDR Field Engineer 
Doug Jackson HDR Project Manager 
Steve Kilcrease ZRC (Fluor) Deputy Project Manager for Administration 
Herb Morgan ZRC (Fluor) Project Manager 
Tim Odell ZRC (Ames) Deputy Project Manager 
Barry Paye Mn/DOT Assistant Segment Engineer 
Keith Quememoen HDR Segment and Project Controls Engineer 
Dave Robinson Kleinfelder Quality Assurance Materials Manager 
Judy Schmidt Mn/DOT District 6 Administrative Manager 
Nick Sovell HDR Construction Manager 
Nelrae Succio Mn/DOT District 6 Engineer 
Jim V alyntine ZRC (Kraemer) Structures Manager 
Terry Ward Mn/DOT Project Manager 
Tom Wiener HDR Project Controls Manager 
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APPENDIX C. SUMMARY TABLE OF RESPONSES 
Interviewee No. 
Performance 1 2 3 4 
Parameter 
Administrative Same Higher in D-B Same or lower Similar, but 
Costs due to added withD-B ultimately 
staff, more higher in D-B 
reviews, etc. 
Construction Up front costs 5- Lower overall in Less than 5% Less with D-B; 
Costs 10% higher; D-B; risk is cost overrun savings from 
change orders higher but with D-B, better minimal change 
10-15% less change orders than traditional orders and low 
with design- are lower jobs cost growth 
build (D-B) 
Time Less overall in Shorter in D-B Shorter in D-B; Faster and 
D-B; unforeseen original plan shorter in D-B; 
environmental was about 10 would've been 
conditions used years several different 
schedule float projects in 
traditional 
Management Some issues are Same Somewhat more Unclear; 
Complexity less complex in complex in D-B; challenges were 
D-B, some are issues arose related to roles 
more complex because process and newness of 
was new the system 
Disruptions to Same, except Process is Disruptions are Disruptions less 
Third Parties third parties are smoother in D-B easier to handle in D-B; public 
kept more interaction was 
informed in D-B different 
Road User Lower inD-B Lower inD-B LowerinD-B Reduced by 
Costs speed, schedule 
Quality of Quality and end Quality is good; Definitely above Quality is there, 
Project result are better disagrees with average; credits but system for 
under D-B Mn/DOT belief contractor more achieving 
that quality than the process quality didn't 
requires QC function as it 
involvement should 
Innovation More innovation Unsure; feels Several D-B allowed 
occurs in D-B, DOT specs were examples of contractor more 
but there could too prescriptive, good innovation opportunity to 
be even more both sides lose (MSE walls, be innovative 
potential benefit GPS grading) 
Funding 
Flexibility 
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SUMMARY TABLE OF RESPONSES (2) 
Interviewee No. 
Performance 5 6 7 8 
Parameter 
Administrative Unsure; some D-B is a cost Lower in D-B; 
Costs added costs on saver in large project is 
this project not projects accelerated and 
in traditional owner's over-
head is different 
Construction No savings in LowerbyD-B Same or higher 
Costs construction because less in D-B; hard to 
costs in D-B; mobilization say if that is 
benefit is value costs, less attributable to 
of time savings change orders delivery method 
Time Shorter in D-B; Quite shorter in Time is saved in D-B is definitely 
certain phases D-B D-B shorter, with 
such as planning more contractor 
may take longer input before 
letting 
Management More complex Muchmore Unsure; some D-B projects are 
Complexity inD-B complex in D-B things more more difficult to 
complex, such manage because 
as verifying they are so 
subcontractors' schedule-driven 
hours 
Disruptions to Impacts not Disruptions less Disruptions 
Third Parties unique to D-B, in D-B because were less 
but D-B gives of schedule because certain 
more flexibility concessions 
to work around were made 
Road User Same costs LowerinD-B 
Costs occur either way 
Quality of Issues in QC Same Quality was 
Project and QA were achieved, but 
more due to not because of 
Mn/DOT D-B; quality 
preferences than processes were 
D-B delivery less successful 
Innovation More innovation Innovation was 
in D-B; easy to improved versus 
solve problems traditional 
as they arise 
Funding 
Flexibility 
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SUMMARY TABLE OF RESPONSES (3) 
Interviewee No. 
Performance 9 10 11 12 
Parameter 
Administrative Less with D-B; More up-front In general, D-B Overhead costs 
Costs faster and with costs in D-B, costs more than are the same or 
better document reduced over life D-B-B higher in D-B 
control of the project because new 
Construction Higher in D-B May save with Probably same; 
Costs because of D-B, but hard to need to consider 
newness compare time-value of 
money 
Time Shorter in D-B Time saved with Shorter in D-B 7 years faster on 
D-B; project is due to overlap this project from 
year ahead of of design and use ofD-B 
schedule construction; 
plans can be less 
comprehensive 
Management Unsure; depends Communication D-B is much Traffic flow was 
Complexity more on project is more complex more complex, difficult; PR and 
type than many things run utilities more 
delivery method concurrently manageable 
Disruptions to Community Public Better with D-B; Favorable on 
Third Parties feedback more perception is shorter duration ROC-52; single 
favorable for good; of construction point of contact 
this D-B project disruptions are results in shorter made 
less with D-B duration of information 
due to schedule disruptions sharing easier 
Road User Same costs 
Costs occur either way 
Quality of Quality is better Same or better D-B should not Mn/DOT will 
Project on this project with D-B, due to affect quality; a get quality, but 
because of good contractor; shady D-B-B was a big issue; 
duplication of problems with contractor is a tried to fit 
efforts QA and QC shady D-B traditional 
processes contractor process into D-B 
Innovation More innovation D-B allowed 
is possible in D- more innovation 
B; theme ofD-B in traffic 
should be end maintenance, 
product, not staging, 
process control economy 
Funding 
Flexibility 
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SUMMARY TABLE OF RESPONSES (4) 
Interviewee No. 
Performance 13 14 15 16 
Parameter 
Administrative D-B is lower D-B eliminates Higher in D-B; Unclear 
Costs costs of having fund increase for 
multiple projects staffing 
Construction Some cost 
Costs reduction in D-B 
from fewer 
changes, but 
hard to tell 
Time D-B always Faster in D-B Would have 
quicker than been longer by 
traditional traditional 
Management Additional D-B presents Project itself 
Complexity complexity with challenges was complex, 
developing new within DOT of regardless of 
D-B processes; balancing short- delivery method 
depends on term and long-
project rather term staffing 
than delivery needs 
Disruptions to Disruptions D-Bmade Some things 
Third Parties were handled project more handled well, 
well on this reasonable to the others were 
project community difficult 
Road User Unclear; driver 
Costs stress the same 
Quality of Quality is D-B will not Quality 
Project comparable to have effect on achieved, but 
other projects; quality; depends not because of 
DOT system for on contractor's system; QA took 
quality is ability to larger role than 
antiquated produce quality planned 
Innovation More in D-B; D-B encouraged 
HDR's project more innovation 
database was withATCs, 
useful in dispute alignment, etc. 
resolution 
Funding D-Bmade D-B has helped Decreased 
Flexibility funding more flexibility, but district funding, 
flexible within created future problem with 
operations funding Mn/DOT and 
budget challenges not with D-B 
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SUMMARY TABLE OF RESPONSES (5) 
Interviewee No. 
Performance 17 18 19 
Parameter 
Administrative Not necessarily D-B on ROC-52 
Costs any different had additional 
costs: RFP 
process, 
oversight 
Construction With D-B, first Traditional is Less in D-B 
Costs costs about the cheaper, but low because of value 
same, changes cost growth of time 
are less makes D-B 
competitive 
Time Time is saved in D-B reduced D-B is faster, 
D-B in many time from 11 to allows overlap 
areas 5 years, then of design and 
down to 3 years construction 
Management More complex D-B challenge is Was more 
Complexity in D-B: adapting to figure out complex due to 
from traditional, roles; need newness and 
scheduling effective project understanding 
manager roles 
Disruptions to Better with D-B: Public approval Contractor 
Third Parties accommodations is high; traffic handled 
were made, PR maintenance, disruptions well 
was more PR, and onROC-52 
responsive contractor effort 
Road User Same costs D-B helped Unsure; hard to 
Costs either way minimize RUCs quantify 
due to timeline 
Quality of Quality is being Equivalent or Material quality 
Project achieved, but better than on is better; doesn't 
contractor's QC traditional; attribute quality 
has been credits QA for to system, QC 
minimal to taking this was lacking in 
reduce overhead some areas 
Innovation Innovation sped ATC process D-B allowed 
up project and was successful; ATCs that could 
improved pressure more not happen 
production performance- under traditional 
based specs 
Funding D-B enabled 
Flexibility FAC funding 
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